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I. INTRODUCTION
Showup identifications ("showups") are pretrial identifications
wherein only one individual is placed before an eyewitness for identifi-
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cation.1 Studies have shown that approximately 40% of eyewitness
identifications are mistaken.2 Moreover, there is substantial support
for the notion that misidentifications made pursuant to showups are
likely more prevalent than misidentifications made pursuant to line-
ups or photographic arrays. 3 Despite the unreliability of showup iden-
tifications, juries generally rely heavily upon these identifications at
trial-like they do all eyewitness identifications-even when the de-
fense presents strong evidence that casts substantial doubt upon the
accuracy of the identification.4 Due to jury insensitivity to this poten-
tial for error, juries may be frequently convicting innocent people on
the basis of showup misidentifications.
This Article explains that eyewitness misidentifications made pur-
suant to showups, as well as juror reliance on such misidentifications,
result from a combination of factors, including inadequate police pro-
cedures for conducting showups, overly lenient admissibility require-
ments for showup identifications, and judicial failure to admit expert
testimony pertaining to eyewitness identifications to aid the jury in
evaluating eyewitness identifications. In response to these failings of
the current system, this Article recommends restricting when the po-
lice may conduct showups, restricting the procedures police officers
may use during showups, and heightening the admissibility require-
1. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (8th ed. 2004).
2. Aldert Vrij, Psychological Factors in Eyewitness Testimony, in PSYCHOLOGY AND
LAw: TRUTHFULNESS AccuRAcY AND CREDIBILITY 105, 106 (Amina Memon, Aldert
Vrij & Ray Bull eds., 1998).
3. See Richard Gonzalez, Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Maceo Pembroke, Response Biases
in Lineups and Showups, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 525, 525 (1993) ("In
a recent survey of psychological experts in the field of eyewitness testimony, 78%
of the sample agreed that 'the use of a one-person showup instead of a full lineup
increases the risk of misidentification,' and 65% felt that the evidence for [that]
proposition was generally reliable or very reliable." (citation omitted)); R. C. L.
Lindsay et al., Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential Lineups, and Showups: Eyewit-
ness Identification Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 391,
393-402 (1997) (finding an increased rate of misidentification pursuant to
showup identifications made by children); Willem A. Wagenaar & Nancy Veef-
kind, Comparison of One-Person and Many-Person Lineups: A Warning Against
Unsafe Practices, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 275,
283-84 (Friedrich Lbsel et al. eds., 1992) (noting that one-person identifications
"[should] be avoided as they increase the likelihood of false identifications"); Gary
L. Wells, Police Lineups: Data, Theory, and Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
791, 795 (2001) (explaining that a "lineup is superior [to a showup] because it can
control errors by spreading errors to the fillers ('known errors'), whereas an error
with a show-up is always an error of mistakenly identifying a suspect"); Jessica
Lee, Note, No Exigency, No Consent: Protecting Innocent Suspects from the Conse-
quences of Non-Exigent Show-Ups, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 755, 759-60
(2005) ("Show-ups are inferior to lineups due to the increased chances for mis-
taken identification.").
4. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Loftus, Incredible Eyewitness, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Dec. 1974,
at 117.
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ments for showup identifications. Further, this Article recommends
that there be general admissibility of expert testimony pertaining to
eyewitness identification should be generally admissible to assist ju-
ries in evaluating eyewitness testimony.
Although many scholars have addressed the problems associated
with eyewitness identifications, as well as possible solutions, few have
addressed the issue specifically within the context of showup identifi-
cations. Moreover, legal scholarship has not suggested a comprehen-
sive approach recommending changes to police procedures,
admissibility requirements, and the use of expert witness testimony to
address the many problems particular to showup identifications.5
This Article presents such a comprehensive approach.
II. INACCURATE EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
In the early morning hours of June 23, 1984, as a mid-twenties
woman left a Bronx, New York convenience store, a man grabbed her
from behind, placed a box cutter to her throat, pushed her into a blue
and white Grand Prix, and drove away.6 The woman's kidnapper took
her to a nearby park, where he raped and orally sodomized her.7 The
assailant then took the woman to a nearby abandoned building where
he raped her again.8 Before leaving the woman, the perpetrator took
her cigarettes and money; cut her face with the box cutter, causing
permanent loss of vision in her left eye; and threatened to kill her if
she called the police. 9 Before she passed out, the woman saw the back
of her assailant as he ran away.10 Upon regaining consciousness, the
woman summoned the police."
The woman told the police that her assailant was "a black male,
approximately twenty seven years, wearing a beige shirt, pants."12
Later, she stated that he was named "Willie" and described him as
approximately five-feet and eight-inches tall and "physically large,"
with a weight of approximately 160 pounds, a short Afro, and a
mustache.13
5. Although the focus of this Article is on showup identifications, some of the argu-
ments are equally relevant to other identification procedures, including lineups
and photographic arrays.
6. Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Profile-Alan Newton, http://www.innocence
project.org/Content/227.php (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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While recuperating in the hospital during the two days after her
attack, the woman viewed approximately two hundred photographs. 14
The woman ultimately selected Alan Newton's photograph as the pho-
tograph of her attacker.15 On June 27, 1984, police presented the
clerk of the convenience store from which the woman was abducted
with a photographic array that included Newton's photograph.16 The
clerk also selected Newton's photograph.17 Less than a week after the
abduction, on June 28, 1984, the victim and the convenience store
clerk each identified Newton in a lineup as the assailant.18 The wo-
man also identified Newton as her attacker at trial.19 Unfortunately,
both the victim and the convenience store clerk identified the wrong
person,20 resulting in Newton also becoming a victim-a victim of eye-
witness misidentification.
Newton steadfastly maintained his innocence and presented an al-
ibi defense at his trial. 2 1 Newton asserted that on the night of the
attack he, along with his fiancee, his fianc~e's daughter, and other rel-
atives, had attended a showing of Ghostbusters at a Brooklyn movie
theater and then returned to his fianc6e's house where he spent the
night and had breakfast.22 Both Newton's fianc6e and his fianc6e's
daughter corroborated Newton's testimony.23 Despite the corrobo-
rated alibi, in May 1985, Newton was found guilty of numerous
charges relating to the June 1984 attack.24 More than twenty years
after the attack, DNA evidence conclusively demonstrated that
Newton was not the source of the spermatozoa recovered from the vic-
tim immediately after the rapes.25 In 2006, a joint motion filed by the
Bronx County District Attorney's Office and the Innocence Project va-
cated Newton's conviction.2 6 On July 6, 2006, Newton, an innocent
man, finally went free.27
As horrifying as the above story is for both the victim of the attack
and the victim of the misidentification, this story is not unique. Every
year almost 80,000 individuals are targeted based on eyewitness iden-
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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tification. 28 Yet, studies have shown that approximately 40% of eye-
witness identifications are mistaken,2 9  resulting in mistaken
identification being the leading cause of wrongful conviction such that
wrongful convictions based on mistaken identifications are almost
equal to the sum of all other errors that lead to wrongful convictions. 30
In fact, one recent study of DNA exonerations revealed that 90% of
reviewed cases involved one or more mistaken eyewitness identifica-
tions.31 Hence, eyewitness misidentification is a pervasive problem. 3 2
Moreover, studies indicate that the probability of eyewitness mis-
identification made pursuant to a showup is likely greater than the
probability of eyewitness misidentification made pursuant to a lineup
28. See Alvin G. Goldstein, June E. Chance & Gregory R. Schneller, Frequency of
Eyewitness Identification in Criminal Cases: A Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL.
PSYCHONOMIC Soc'Y 71, 73 (1989).
29. Vrij, supra note 2. For example, in one study, black and white "customers"
browsed in a convenience store for a few minutes and then went to the register to
pay. Stephanie J. Platz & Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness
Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 972, 974-75 (1988).
Researchers asked the convenience store clerks to identify the "customers" from a
photo array. Id. at 975. The overall accuracy rate for all participants' identifica-
tions was only 44.2%. Id. at 977.
30. William David Gross, The Unfortunate Faith: A Solution to the Unwarranted Re-
liance Upon Eyewitness Testimony, 5 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 307, 313 (1999) (cit-
ing PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 3-4 (Siegfried Ludwig
Sporer et al. eds.,1996)); Ayre Rattner, Convicted But Innocent: Wrongful Convic-
tion and the Criminal Justice System, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 283, 287-91 (1988).
At least 75% of DNA exonerations involve convictions based in part on mis-
taken eyewitness identifications. See Innocence Project, Understand the Causes,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2007) (noting
that 77.7% of 130 postconviction DNA exonerations in the United States involved
mistaken eyewitness identifications); see also BARRY SCHECK, PETER NEUFELD &
JIM DWYER, ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 246 (Doubleday 2000) (reporting that mistaken
eyewitness identifications influenced 84% of the 67 wrongful convictions studied);
EDWARD CONNORS, THOMAS LUNDREGAN, NEAL MILLER & TOM McEwEN, CON-
VICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA
EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (Dep't of Justice 1996), http://
www.ncjrs.gov/txtfiles/dnaevid.txt (last visited Oct. 25, 2007) (finding that, of 28
case studies, 86% involved mistaken eyewitness identification).
31. Letter from N.J. Att'y Gen. John J. Farmer, Jr. to All N.J. County Prosecutors et
al. 1 (Apr. 19, 2001) (accompanying Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing
and Conducting Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures, available at
http://www.psychology.iastate.edu/FACULTY/gwells/njguidelines.pdf). Also, the
Innocence Project has used DNA evidence to exonerate more than 101 people
wrongly convicted of a crime based on mistaken eyewitness identification. Inno-
cence Project, supra note 30.
32. As one United States Court of Appeals judge said: "Centuries of experience in the
administration of criminal justice have shown that convictions based solely on
testimony that identifies a defendant previously unknown to the witness is
highly suspect. Of all the various kinds of evidence it is the least reliable, espe-
cially where unsupported by corroborating evidence." Jackson v. Fogg, 589 F.2d
108, 112 (2d Cir. 1978).
2008]
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or photo array.3 3 For example, in one study, showups yielded a poorer
witness ability to accurately discriminate in making identification de-
cisions regarding a suspect than did six to ten person lineups. 34 In
addition, numerous scholars agree that the probability of a showup
misidentification is likely much greater than the corresponding
probability of a lineup or photographic array misidentification.35
Showup misidentifications are likely more prevalent than misiden-
tifications made pursuant to lineups or photographic arrays because
many safeguards that exist with other methods of identification, such
as lineups and photographic arrays, do not exist for showups. The
most important safeguard that exists with lineups and photographic
arrays, but that does not exist for showups, is the presentation of more
than one person from whom to choose.3 6 At the standard police
lineup, also known as a simultaneous lineup, the eyewitness is
presented with all members of the lineup, usually six to eight individ-
uals, at the same time.3 7 At a sequential lineup, the eyewitness still
views numerous individuals, but the eyewitness views each lineup
member separately, moving through the lineup members in a se-
quence. 38 And, at photographic arrays, the eyewitness is presented
with numerous photographs to view when making her identification. 39
In contrast, at a showup, the eyewitness views only one individual. 40
Thus, as the New Jersey Supreme Court explained in State v. Herrera,
there exists "the commonsense notion that one-on-one showups are in-
herently suggestive ... because the victim can only choose from one
person, and, generally, that person is in police custody."4 1
Another important safeguard that exists for many lineups, but for
virtually no showups, is the right to have counsel present. Starting in
the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court began crafting procedu-
ral safeguards intended to shield criminal defendants from wrongful
convictions based in part on eyewitness misidentifications.4 2 In 1967,
33. See supra note 3.
34. Wagenaar & Veefkind, supra note 3, at 283-84.
35. See Wells, supra note 3; Lee, supra note 3.
36. See Gonzalez et al., supra note 3, at 527.
37. Gary L. Wells et al., From the Lab to the Police Station: A Successful Application
of Eyewitness Research, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 581, 585 (2000).
38. Id. at 586.
39. There are instances when police officers show a photograph of only one person to
an eyewitness. This Article does not address the many problems with such an
identification procedure.
40. BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1413 (8th ed. 2004).
41. 902 A.2d 177, 183 (N.J. 2006); see also PATRICK M. WALL, EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFI-
CATION IN CRIMINAL CASES 27-40 (Charles C Thomas 1965) (explaining that
courts and experts are in agreement that showups are "grossly suggestive").
42. Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell Caligiuri, Improv-
ing Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County's Blind Sequential Lineup Pilot
Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 381, 383-84 (2006).
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the Court decided the case of United States v. Wade, in which it held
that, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment, the right to counsel attaches
at all critical stages or pretrial proceedings where "the presence of [de-
fense] counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a
fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the
witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at
the trial itself."43 The Wade Court explained:
[T]oday's law enforcement machinery involves critical confrontations of the
accused by the prosecution at pretrial proceedings where the results might
well settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality. In
recognition of these realities of modern criminal prosecution, our cases have
construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to "critical" stages of the
proceedings. The guarantee reads: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
The plain wording of this guarantee thus encompasses counsel's assistance
whenever necessary to assure a meaningful "defence." 4 4
Thus, the Wade Court held that the postindictment lineup at issue in
the case constituted a pretrial confrontation of the accused at which
the right to counsel existed4 5 because
[t]he confrontation compelled by the State between the accused and the victim
or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence is peculiarly riddled
with innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even
crucially, derogate from a fair trial. The vagaries of eyewitness identification
are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken
identification. Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: "What is the worth of iden-
tification testimony even when uncontradicted? The identification of stran-
gers is proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such testimony are
established by a formidable number of instances in the records of English and
American trials. These instances are recent-not due to the brutalities of an-
cient criminal procedure."4 6
The presence of counsel at an identification is an important safe-
guard against eyewitness misidentification because counsel is likely
"alert for conditions prejudicial to the suspect" that the suspect is un-
likely or unable to notice. a7 In Moore v. Illinois, the Court explained
that "[ijf an accused's counsel is present at [a] pretrial identification,
43. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
44. Id. at 224-25.
45. Id. at 228-39.
46. Id. at 228 (quoting FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI 30
(1927)). The Wade Court further explained:
"It is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out
the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on,
so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other rele-
vant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined there and then,
before the trial."
Id. at 229 (quoting Glanville Williams & H. A. Hammelmann, Identification Pa-
rades-I, 1963 CRIM. L. REv. 479, 482).
47. Id. at 230-31. Moreover, it is likely that police officers conducting a showup iden-
tification in the presence of defense counsel will refrain from engaging in sugges-
tive behaviors.
20081
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86:515
he can serve both his client's and the prosecution's interests by ob-
jecting to suggestive features of a procedure before they influence a
witness' identification."48
Yet, unfortunately, the right to counsel at an eyewitness identifica-
tion extends to virtually no showups, although it extends to a great
number of lineups.49 In Kirby v. Illinois, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel does not extend to preindictment identifi-
cations because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "attaches only
at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been ini-
tiated"50 by way of "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment."5 1 Since Kirby involved a preindictment
showup, the Court held that the right to counsel did not attach to that
identification. 52
Because the Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel does
not extend to a preindictment identification, regardless of the method
48. Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 225 (1977); see also Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d
1179, 1187 (2d Cir. 1981) (noting that counsel might have forestalled the showup,
limited the duration of the witness's observation, or precipitated a proper lineup).
49. Notably, the right to counsel does extend to rarely conducted postindictment
showups. See Solomon, 645 F.2d at 1187 (explaining that the right to counsel
attaches at a postindictment showup).
50. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
51. Id. at 689. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly reaffirmed its hold-
ing in Kirby. See Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519, 523 (2004) ("The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is triggered 'at or after the time that judicial pro-
ceedings have been initiated . . . whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'" (quoting Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977))); McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) ("The
Sixth Amendment right ... does not attach until a prosecution is commenced,
that is 'at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings-
whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information,
or arraignment.'" (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)));
Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 187-88 (1984) (The Sixth Amendment right to counsel "at-
taches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been
initiated against him," which occurs "'by way of formal charge, preliminary hear-
ing, indictment, information, or arraignment.'" (quoting Kirby, 406 U.S. at
688-89)).
In addition, the vast majority of state courts to address the issue post-Kirby
have also held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not extend to
preindictment identifications. See, e.g., Campbell v. State, 426 S.E.2d 45, 46 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1992); People v. Williams, 614 N.E.2d 7, 8-9 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Parsley
v. State, 557 N.E.2d 1331, 1334-35 (Ind. 1990); State v. Ronnebaum, 449 N.W.2d
722, 724 (Minn. 1990); Wilson v. State, 451 So. 2d 718, 722 (Miss. 1984); People v.
Hawkins, 435 N.E.2d 376, 379-80 (N.Y. 1982); State v. Mills, 582 N.E.2d 972,
984-85 (Ohio 1992); Commonwealth v. Rishel, 582 A.2d 662, 665-66 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1990); State v. Parizo, 655 A.2d 716, 717-18 (Vt. 1994).
However, it is noteworthy that at least two state courts have held post-Kirby
that, pursuant to their state constitutions, a defendant is entitled to counsel at a
preindictment lineup. Blue v. State, 558 P.2d 636, 640-42 (Alaska 1977); People
v. Bustamente, 634 P.2d 927, 935-36 (Cal. 1981).
52. Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689.
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of identification, the right to counsel safeguard likely does not extend
to most showups because showups are generally conducted preindict-
ment.5 3 Hence, lacking the safeguard of the right to counsel, showup
misidentifications are likely more prevalent than are postindictment
lineup misidentifications.
Although there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a photo-
graphic array identification, such a safeguard is not nearly as neces-
sary to protect against misidentification because the absence of a live
person at a photographic identification ensures that there are far
fewer possibilities for unfair influence than during a live identifica-
tion.5 4 In Justice Stewart's concurrence in United States v. Ash, he
explained:
A photographic identification is quite different from a lineup, for there are
substantially fewer possibilities of impermissible suggestion when photo-
graphs are used, and those unfair influences can be readily reconstructed at
trial. It is true that the defendant's photograph may be markedly different
from the others displayed, but this unfairness can be demonstrated at trial
from an actual comparison of the photographs used or from the witness'
description of the display. Similarly, it is possible that the photographs could
be arranged in a suggestive manner, or that by comment or gesture the prose-
cuting authorities might single out the defendant's picture. But these are the
kinds of overt influence that a witness can easily recount and that would serve
to impeach the identification testimony. In short, there are few possibilities
for unfair suggestiveness-and those rather blatant and easily reconstructed.
Accordingly, an accused would not be foreclosed from an effective cross-exami-
nation of an identification witness simply because his counsel was not present
at the photographic display. For this reason, a photographic display cannot
fairly be considered a "critical stage" of the prosecution. As the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit aptly concluded: "If ... the identification is not a
live lineup at which defendant may be forced to act, speak or dress in a sug-
gestive way, where the possibilities for suggestion are multiplied, where the
ability to reconstruct the events is minimized, and where the effect of a posi-
tive identification is likely to be permanent, but at a viewing of immobile pho-
tographs easily reconstructible, far less subject to subtle suggestion, and far
less indelible in its effect when the witness is later brought face to face with
53. While exact data on the prevalence of preindictment and postindictment showups
is not available, most of the cases involving showups involve preindictment chal-
lenges. See cases cited supra note 51. A LexisNexis search revealed only a hand-
ful of cases involving postindictment showups. See Thompson v. Mississippi, 914
F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1990); Cannon v. Alabama, 558 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1977); Peo-
ple v. Hunt, 388 N.Y.S.2d 335 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976); State v. Davis, 1996 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4247 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 20, 1996). Thus, a safe assumption is that
preindictment showups, at which the right to counsel does not attach per Kirby,
greatly outnumber postindictment showups. Moreover, logic dictates that once a
defendant is indicted, police employment of a showup, as opposed to another
identification procedure, such as a lineup, seems unlikely.
54. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 324-25 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) (con-
cluding that a postindictment photographic identification is not a "critical stage"
of the prosecution, and, thus, a defendant does not have a Sixth Amendment
right to the presence of counsel at the photographic identification).
2008]
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the accused, there is even less reason to denominate the procedure a critical
stage at which counsel must be present."
5 5
Therefore, although the probability of eyewitness misidentification
is great regardless of the specific identification method used, fewer
safeguards exist at showups, increasing the probability of a showup
misidentification relative to the probability of misidentification pursu-
ant to a lineup or a photographic array.5 6
III. JURY RELIANCE ON EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATIONS
Despite the frequency of eyewitness misidentification, jurors gen-
erally believe eyewitness identifications even when the defense
presents reliable evidence that casts substantial doubt on the eyewit-
ness's identification. 5 7 As the United States Supreme Court has
observed:
[D]espite its inherent unreliability, much eyewitness identification evidence
has a powerful impact on juries . . . .'All the evidence points rather strikingly
to the conclusion that there is almost nothing more convincing than a live
human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says,
"That's the one!"' 5 8
55. Id. at 324-25 (quoting United States ex rel. Reed v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 745
(3d Cir. 1972)).
56. There is little debate that an identification made pursuant to a photographic ar-
ray is less reliable than an identification made pursuant to a lineup. See Manson
v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 132 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Because photos
are static, two-dimensional, and often outdated, they are 'clearly inferior in relia-
bility' to corporeal procedures." (quoting WALL, supra note 41, at 70)). Notwith-
standing the failings of photographs, it is likely that an identification made
pursuant to a photographic array is more reliable than a showup identification
given the lack of safeguards that exist at a showup identification that are present
at a photographic array. See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 594 (Wis. 2005)
("A lineup or photo array is generally fairer than a showup, because it distributes
the probability of identification among the number of persons arrayed, thus re-
ducing the risk of a misidentification.").
57. Cindy J. O'Hagan, Note, When Seeing is Not Believing: The Case for Eyewitness
Expert Testimony, 81 GEO. L.J. 741, 750 (1993) (noting that there are numerous
cases illustrating how juries often believe dubious eyewitnesses).
58. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting ELIZABETH F. LoFrus, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 19 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1979)). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in a case involving eye-
witness identification, noted:
There can be no reasonable doubt that inaccurate eyewitness testimony
may be one of the most prejudicial features of a criminal trial. Juries,
naturally desirous to punish a vicious crime, may well be unschooled in
the effects that the subtle compound of suggestion, anxiety, and forget-
fulness in the face of the need to recall often has on witnesses. Accord-
ingly, doubts over the strength of the evidence of a defendant's guilt may
be resolved on the basis of the eyewitness' seeming certainty when he
points to the defendant and exclaims with conviction that veils all doubt,
"'[T]hat's the man!'"
Kampshoff v. Smith, 698 F.2d 581, 585 (2d Cir. 1983) (quoting United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967)).
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Psychological research indicates that juries believe eyewitness
identifications most of the time, regardless of whether circumstances
suggest the identification is incorrect.59 One study examined three
sets of mock jurors at an experimental robbery trial.60 All three sets
of jurors were presented with the same evidence. 6 1 However, the first
set of mock jurors was told that no eyewitness existed, and only 18%
voted to convict the defendant. 6 2 The second set of mock jurors heard
a clerk testify that he saw the robbery and that the defendant was the
robber he had seen.6 3 The defense attorney argued that the clerk was
mistaken. 64 Seventy-two percent of the second set of mock jurors
voted to convict the defendant. 65 The third set of mock jurors ob-
served a clerk who testified that he saw the robbery and who stated
that the defendant was the robber; however, the defense attorney dis-
credited this clerk by compelling the clerk to admit that he was legally
blind and not wearing his glasses at the time of the robbery.66 Despite
the suspect nature of the eyewitness identification presented, 68% of
the third set of mock jurors still voted to convict.67 Thus, jurors have
a strong propensity to believe eyewitness identifications, even when
the identification is of dubious reliability.
In the same vein, in the absence of other culpatory evidence, jurors
will convict a defendant based solely on eyewitness testimony; a study
conducted in the United Kingdom reported an approximate 75% con-
viction rate when eyewitness testimony was the only evidence against
the defendant presented at trial.68 And, in approximately half of
those cases, there was only one eyewitness. 69
Beyond studies, American history is replete with real life illustra-
tions of juries believing tenuous eyewitness identifications despite the
presentation of reliable defense evidence or the absence of corroborat-
ing evidence. For example, Payne Boyd, tried three times for the same
murder, was convicted largely on the basis of the identifications made
by eight eyewitnesses who testified that he was the murderer. 70 Eight
59. See, e.g., Loftus, supra note 4.
60. Loftus, supra note 4, at 117-18.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. LORD DEVLIN, REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
OF THE DEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE OF IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL
CASES 162-63 (London, 1976).
69. Id.
70. EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 23-27 (Yale Univ. Press 1932)
(citing State v. Boyd, record on file with the Clerk of Circuit Court, Cabell
County, W. Va. (1925)).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
positive identifications seems impressive until one realizes that there
were fifty-five witnesses at Boyd's trial, thirty-one of whom were posi-
tive that Boyd had not committed the murder.7 1 Despite the conflict-
ing eyewitness testimony, Boyd was convicted. 72 Boyd ultimately
served a year and a half of a life sentence before his exoneration.
73
The case of Harry Cashin, whose murder conviction was reversed
on appeal, provides an example of a jury that believed a problematic
eyewitness identification, despite the presence of strong defense evi-
dence suggesting that the identification was likely erroneous. 7 4 At
Cashin's trial, the sole culpatory evidence was a single eyewitness
who had failed to make a positive identification previously; no other
witness to the crime identified Cashin.7 5 Furthermore, Cashin did not
resemble the description of the murderer given by other eyewit-
nesses,7 6 and Cashin had an alibi corroborated by his fiancee and his
fianc6e's aunt.7 7 Despite the fact that the only evidence against
Cashin was a solitary questionable eyewitness identification, the jury
convicted Cashin of murder.78
The Sacco-Vanzetti case provides another example of juror reliance
on a questionable identification. 79 One witness, Mary Splaine,
testified:
I noticed particularly the left hand was a good sized hand, a hand that de-
noted strength .... The forehead was high. The hair was brushed back and it
was between, I should think, two inches and two and one-half inches in length
and had dark eyebrows, but the complexion was a white, peculiar white that
looked greenish. 8 0
The basis for Splaine's identification in this case was her glimpse of
the perpetrator, from a distance of at least 60 feet, as he drove by.8 1
Despite the implausibility of the eyewitness's identification, at least
two jurors were "greatly impressed by it."82
A more modern problematic eyewitness identification believed and
relied upon by a jury is that of Kenneth Solomon.8 3 On October 7,
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. People v. Cashin, 182 N.E. 74 (N.Y. 1932).
75. Id. at 75-76.
76. Id. at 76. For example, it was likely the actual murderer had an injury, yet
Cashin was not injured. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. O'Hagan, supra note 57, at 750 n.62; see also COMMONWEALTH VS. SACCO AND
VANZETTI 25-35 (Robert P. Weeks ed., 1958) (providing a transcript of the testi-
mony of Mary Splaine) [hereinafter COMMONWEALTH].
80. COMMONWEALTH, supra note 79, at 27.
81. Id. at 31.
82. O'Hagan, supra note 57, at 750 n.62 (quoting COMMONWEALTH, supra note 79, at
27).
83. See Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1181 (2d Cir. 1981).
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1974, three black males, one of whom was wearing a hood, robbed a
doctor's office and also raped and sodomized receptionist Nancy
Padovani.84 One day after the crime, Padovani selected a picture of
Solomon in a manner characterized by the police as a "negative," but
"possible," identification.8 5
In a subsequent biased lineup at which all the other lineup partici-
pants were significantly taller than Solomon except for one individual
who weighed sixty-five pounds more than Solomon, Padovani identi-
fied Solomon as her attacker.8 6 However, prior to the lineup, the po-
lice had shown Solomon's photograph to Padovani several times, and
Padovani had viewed Solomon, who was without counsel, at a pro-
tracted showup at Solomon's own arraignment.8 7 In contrast, at an
unsuggestive lineup, in which Solomon was not a participant,
Padovani selected another individual who better fit her initial descrip-
tion of her attacker.8 8
The only evidence presented against Solomon by the prosecution
was eyewitness testimony.8 9 Despite the extremely dubious identifi-
cation of Solomon by Padovani and the lack of any non-eyewitness evi-
dence corroborating Padovani's identification, the jury convicted
Solomon of robbery, rape, and sodomy.90 Several years later, the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted Solomon's writ of habeas corpus on the basis that the identifi-
cation of Solomon had violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. 9 1 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision. 9 2
Hence, it is clear that jurors believe, and subsequently convict de-
fendants on the basis of, doubtful eyewitness identifications-even
when the defense has presented strong contradictory evidence and
when evidence corroborating the identification is absent.
IV. PROCEDURES EMPLOYED BY POLICE OFFICERS
Given the frequency of showup misidentifications, the greater risk
of showup misidentifications relative to lineup misidentifications, and
jury reliance on dubious identifications to convict, comprehensive
changes to the entire criminal justice system, including police proce-
84. Id. at 1182.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1183. Padovani also identified Solomon as her attacker at trial. Id. at
1181.
87. Id. at 1181-82.
88. Id. at 1182.
89. Id. at 1181.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1182.
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dures, are necessary. This part of the Article sets forth procedures
that should be required of and employed by all police officers.
A. Exigency
Showups should be conducted only when necessitated by exigency
such that conducting a lineup or photographic array is impractica-
ble. 93 Exigency may exist in numerous instances. One instance of ex-
igency is when the eyewitness is likely dying and is not well enough to
travel to the police station or jail to observe a lineup, and the police
cannot conduct a proper lineup outside of a police station or a jail.94
In such an instance, it is appropriate for police officers to conduct a
showup because it is the only way the police can obtain an identifica-
tion. Exigency might also exist when police officers must immediately
determine whether they have the right person in custody. For exam-
ple, when a potential victim's life is at risk, police officers must deter-
mine immediately whether the suspect they have in custody is the
perpetrator. Another example is when a suspect is fleeing, yet the po-
lice officers lack probable cause to detain the suspect at the police sta-
tion for a period of time sufficient to conduct a lineup.95
A ban on the use of showups absent exigent circumstances places
minimal additional burden on police officers but would likely decrease
the overall number of eyewitness misidentifications made given the
ban's probable drastic reduction in the number of showups con-
ducted.9 6 Unfortunately, although some police departments have de-
veloped internal guidelines requiring that showups be conducted only
when exigency mandates, 9 7 many police departments regularly con-
93. See Lee, supra note 3, at 755 (advocating for an exigent circumstances prerequi-
site before police officers may conduct showups).
94. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (explaining that a showup at the
victim's hospital room was necessary because the victim was the only person who
could identify the suspect, no one knew how long the victim would live, and de-
spite the hospital's close proximity, the victim was unable to go to the jail or the
police station for a proper lineup due to her health). It is noteworthy that al-
though conducting a lineup in a hospital room is not feasible, conducting a photo-
graphic array might be feasible so long as the eyewitness's health prevails long
enough for the police to put together an appropriate photographic array.
95. See Lee, supra note 3, at 763 (noting that exigency exists when "the suspect is
fleeing").
96. It is true, however, that prohibiting police officers from conducting showups ab-
sent exigency will not increase the reliability of an identification made pursuant
to a showup.
97. See, e.g., LA CROSSE POLICE DEPARTMENT, GENERAL ORDERS MANUAL § 19.3.05
(Jul. 18, 2007), http://www.cityoflacrosse.orgDocumentView.asp?DID=385 (last
visited Oct. 25, 2007); Metropolitan Police Department Washington D.C., Pretrial
Eyewitness Identification (Nov. 25, 1974), http://www.lefande.com/MPDGOs/304.
07.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2007).
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duct showups absent exigent circumstances.9 8 In order to reduce the
number of showups conducted, which in turn will reduce the number
of showup misidentifications made, every police department should
have a mandatory policy prohibiting showups except when police of-
ficers are presented with exigent circumstances.
B. Close Temporal Proximity
Showups should be conducted only in close temporal proximity to
the time when the eyewitness first viewed the criminal (i.e., the "wit-
nessing event"). "'One of the most stable findings of psychological re-
search is that verbal information and pictorial information tend to be
forgotten as time passes."' 99 An eyewitness's memory, however, does
not deteriorate gradually, but rather deteriorates rapidly immediately
after an event and then deteriorates little over extended time. 10 0 One
eyewitness expert found that after twenty-four hours, "[mlemory for
physical attributes of strangers' age, hair color, and height are usually
inaccurate."10 1 In fact, within only a few hours of the witnessing
event, studies suggest that facial features are often forgotten.102
Therefore, eyewitness identifications, conducted in any fashion,
are less reliable when conducted after a delay. However, when the
identification is delayed, the probability of the eyewitness making a
misidentification is significantly greater when the identification is
made pursuant to a showup than when the identification is made pur-
suant to a lineup. One study found that the percentage of mistaken
identifications that occurred right after an event took place was 16%
for a lineup and 18% for a showup.10 3 Only twenty-four hours later,
98. See State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 197 (N.J. 2006) (Albin, J., dissenting) ("De-
spite the widespread condemnation of the unnecessary use of showups, the police
continue to employ the technique in unwarranted circumstances."); Steven P.
Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court's Due Process Test
Fails to Meet Its Own Criteria, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 59-60 (1981) (noting that
police use of showups flourishes under a totality of the circumstances approach);
Lee, supra note 3, at 768 (explaining that showups are "still routinely used in the
field and in the stationhouse").
99. Lee, supra note 3, at 769-70 (quoting KATHERINE W. ELLISON & ROBERT
BucKHouT, PSYCHOLOGY AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 103 (Harper & Row 1981) (citing
WAYNE A. WICKELGREN, LEARNING AND MEMORY (Prentice-Hall 1977))).
100. See LOFTUS, supra note 58, at 53; JOHN W. SHEPHERD, HADYN D. ELLIS & GRAHAM
M. DAVIES, IDENTIFICATION EVIDENCE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 80-86 (Ab-
erdeen Univ. Press 1982); Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identi-
fication and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 399 (1987).
101. A. DANIEL YARMEY, UNDERSTANDING POLICE AND POLICE WORK: PSYCHOSOCIAL IS-
SUES 298-99 (N.Y. Univ. Press 1990).
102. Id. at 299 (noting that memory for most information appears to deteriorate
quickly after a witnessing event).
103. A. Daniel Yarmey et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in Showups and
Lineups, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 459, 464 (1996); Lee, supra note 3, at 770 (dis-
cussing the findings of the Yarmey study).
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the percentage of lineup misidentifications was 14%, whereas the per-
centage of showup misidentifications was 53%.104 Thus, because as
time passes the likelihood of a showup misidentification rapidly out-
paces the probability of a lineup misidentification, police departments
ought to adopt mandatory policies prohibiting the use of showups ex-
cept when the showup will take place in close temporal proximity to
the eyewitness's initial observation of the criminal.
C. Suggestive Behaviors
When conducting showup identifications, police officers must avoid
suggestive behaviors, such as showing the suspect to the witness more
than once or showing the suspect to the witness while the suspect is in
a squad car, because suggestive identifications have no beneficial
value.105 As one commentator has noted:
Unnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures differ from most
other improper law enforcement activities because they do not further any
valid law enforcement interest. Although a violation of a suspect's fourth or
fifth amendment rights-for example, a warrantless search or an interroga-
tion without a lawyer present-is plainly wrong, it might at least further the
valid law enforcement objective of collecting relevant evidence. By contrast,
an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure simply creates unrelia-
ble evidence where reliable evidence could have been gathered. It is not a case
where good ends justify bad means-the end result of an unnecessarily sug-
gestive procedure is worthless precisely because of the means used.
1 0 6
As such, police departments ought to adopt mandatory policies prohib-
iting police officers from engaging in certain specified suggestive be-
haviors when conducting showups.
To determine what suggestive behaviors should be per se prohib-
ited, one should start by looking to the sound teachings of the Wiscon-
sin Supreme Court.1o7 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in State v.
Dubose, stated:
[I]t is important that showups are not conducted in locations, or in a manner,
that implicitly conveys to the witness that the suspect is guilty. Showups con-
ducted in police stations, squad cars, or with the suspect in handcuffs that are
visible to any witness, all carry with them inferences of guilt, and thus should
be considered suggestive .... [Also], it is important that a suspect be shown
to the witness only once. If a suspect is identified, the police have no reason to
conduct further identification procedures. Conversely, if the suspect is not
identified by the witness, he or she should not be presented to that witness in
any subsequent showups. 1 0 8
104. Yarmey et al., supra note 103, at 464; Lee, supra note 3, at 770 (discussing the
findings of the Yarmey study).
105. See Benjamin E. Rosenberg, Rethinking the Right to Due Process in Connection
with Pretrial Identification Procedures: An Analysis and a Proposal, 79 Ky. L.J.
259, 291 (1991).
106. Id.
107. See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. 2005).
108. Id. at 594.
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Mandatory policies prohibiting police officers from engaging in the
above-discussed suggestive showup procedures place minimal burdens
on police officers but might significantly reduce the number of sugges-
tive showup identifications conducted, which in turn likely will reduce
the number of showup misidentifications made.1 0 9 Thus, such sugges-
tive behaviors should be prohibited.
D. Proactive Procedures
When conducting showup identifications, in addition to refraining
from the overt suggestive behaviors discussed above, police officers
should engage in certain proactive specified behaviors that will de-
crease inadvertent suggestiveness. Because suggestive identifications
have no beneficial value,'1O police officers must do everything in their
power to eliminate suggestive identifications, which includes being
proactive. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has suggested one impor-
tant proactive procedure whereby police officers tell an eyewitness
"that the real suspect may or may not be present, and that the investi-
gation will continue regardless of the result of the impending identifi-
cation procedure."311 The Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that
such a procedure is beneficial because "a witness's memory of an event
can be fragile and . . . the amount and accuracy of the information
obtained from a witness depends in part on the method of question-
ing."1 1 2 Again, this proactive procedure places minimal burden on the
police officers conducting the showup but may reduce the number of
misidentifications made pursuant to showups. Thus, all police depart-
ments should mandate the use of this proactive procedure.' 1 3
109. Another unnecessarily suggestive behavior from which police officers should re-
frain is giving postidentification feedback to an eyewitness. Confirmatory pos-
tidentification feedback, such as "You identified the correct person" has resulted
in "eyewitnesses indicating greater certainty in the identification, a better view of
the [criminal], a greater ability to make out details of the [criminal's] face,
greater attention to the event .... [and] greater willingness to testify." E.g., Don-
ald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice's Eyewitness Evidence: A
Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 267 (2000) (citing Gary L. Wells
& Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 360,
366 (1998)).
110. See Rosenberg, supra note 105.
111. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 594.
112. Id. (quoting NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS Evi-
DENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAw ENFORCEMENT 3-4 (1999)).
113. Another proactive procedure is the blind administration of identification proce-
dures. A blindly administered showup is one whereby the officer conducting the
showup does not know the identity of the person targeted. See Winn S. Collins,
Looks Can be Deceiving: Safeguards for Eyewitness Identification, Wis. LAw.,
Mar. 2004, at 11. Lineups and photographic arrays have been administered
blindly. For example, North Carolina requires blind administration of photo ar-
rays and lineups. Id. (citing Letter from I. Beverly Lake Jr., Chief Justice, Sup.
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E. Summary
The procedures employed by the police officers who conduct show-
ups are the first line of defense against misidentification. As such,
police officers should conduct showups only when necessitated by exi-
gency and only in close temporal proximity to the witnessing event. In
addition, police officers must avoid suggestive behaviors and should
engage in proactive procedures that will likely reduce the inherent
suggestiveness of a showup. Employment of these procedures by po-
lice officers will not only increase the likelihood of correct identifica-
tions being made pursuant to showups, but also will decrease the
overall number of showup identifications conducted. In turn, this has
the potential to decrease the total number of misidentifications made
by eyewitnesses. Therefore, the above procedures should be
mandatory, regardless of whether the mandatory nature of these pro-
cedures results from judicial rulings, legislative action, or internal po-
lice directives.
V. ADMISSIBILITY
The present court admissibility requirements for showup identifi-
cations are insufficient to prevent the admission of problematic
showup identifications. This Part of the Article sets forth the present
court admissibility requirements for showup identifications, as well as
the problems with these requirements. This Part then discusses sev-
eral recommended changes to the admissibility requirements for
showup identifications.
A. Present Admissibility Requirements
The admissibility of showup identifications is determined pursuant
to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 114 In 1977,
in Manson v. Brathwaite, the United States Supreme Court stated
Ct. of N.C., to Scott Perry et al., Director, Criminal Justice Training & Standards,
N.C. Dep't. of Justice (Oct. 9, 2003)). New Jersey has also implemented blind
administration procedures. Id. (citing Letter from John J. Farmer, Jr., N.J. Att'y
Gen., to All County Prosecutors et al., at 1-2 (Apr. 18, 2001), available at http:ll
www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf).
Although blindly administered showups would likely reduce the number of
showup misidentifications, as the possibility for inadvertent suggestion on the
part of the police officer administering the showup would be drastically limited,
blindly administered showups may prove impractical because at a showup, un-
like at a lineup or a photographic array, only one suspect is presented to the
eyewitness for identification purposes. Thus, it may be difficult for the officer
administering the showup not to know the identity of the person targeted.
In addition, implementing blind administration of any identification proce-
dure may also prove more difficult in smaller police departments with few inves-
tigators. See Klobuchar, Steblay & Caligiuri, supra note 42, at 406-07.
114. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967).
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that due process "permits the admission of ... confrontation evidence
[such as a showup identification] if, despite the suggestive aspect, the
out-of-court identification possesses certain features of reliability.""15
Hence, a court must examine the totality of the circumstances such
that "if the challenged identification is reliable [regardless of whether
the procedures used were unnecessarily suggestive], then testimony
as to it and any identification in its wake is admissible."" 6 Thus, the
Manson Court rejected the idea that due process"1 7 requires "exclu-
sion of the out-of-court identification evidence, without regard to relia-
bility, whenever it has been obtained through unnecessarily
suggestive confrontation procedures""18 because "a suggestive prei-
ndictment identification does not in itself intrude upon a constitution-
ally protected interest."119 The Manson Court reasoned that its
totality of the circumstances approach, with reliability as the admissi-
bility "linchpin,"120 best serves three important interests that must be
taken into consideration: (1) preventing juries from hearing "eyewit-
ness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability;"121 (2)
deterring police officers from engaging in unnecessarily suggestive
procedures; and (3) administering justice, which includes preventing
the guilty from going free. 12 2
Hence, Manson set forth a two-pronged analysis to determine the
admissibility of showup identifications.12 3 The first prong requires a
court to determine whether the identification procedure was unneces-
115. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110 (1977).
116. Id. at n.10.
117. It is noteworthy that the Manson court explained that the standard required by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is "fairness." Id. at 113.
118. Id. at 110.
119. Id. at 113 n.13.
120. Id. at 114.
121. Id. at 112
122. Id. at 112-13.
123. See Wilson v. Mitchell, 250 F.3d 388, 397 (6th Cir. 2001) (detailing a two-pronged
suggestiveness and reliability analysis); United States v. Woodward, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18006, at *5 (1st Cir. July 25, 2000) (explaining that to determine
the admissibility of an out-of-court identification, a court must engage in a two-
pronged inquiry: (1) determine whether the procedure was unnecessarily sugges-
tive; and (2) if unnecessarily suggestive, "under the totality of the circumstances,
[was] the identification itself [] reliable"); Nauton v. Newland, 1998 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8488, at *6 (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 1998) (explaining that even if a pretrial
identification procedure is unnecessarily suggestive, the court must examine
whether the identification, nevertheless, was reliable); State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d
177, 183 (N.J. 2006) (The United States Supreme Court has set forth a two-pro-
nged analysis which "requires the court first to ascertain whether the identifica-
tion procedure was impermissibly suggestive, and, if so, whether the
unnecessarily suggestive procedure was nevertheless reliable. The totality of the
circumstances must be considered in weighing the suggestive nature of the iden-
tification against the reliability of the identification.").
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sarily suggestive.1 24 Only if a court finds that the identification proce-
dure was unnecessarily suggestive does a court examine the second
prong, which requires a determination of whether, despite the use of
unnecessarily suggestive procedures, the identification was neverthe-
less reliable. In determining reliability, the Manson Court stated that
the following factors should be considered:
the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime,
the witness's degree of attention, the accuracy of [the witness's] prior descrip-
tion of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation,
and the time between the crime and the confrontation. 125
Only if the reviewing court finds that the showup was both unnecessa-
rily suggestive and unreliable will a showup be deemed
inadmissible.126
Some of the factors courts have considered when determining
whether a showup procedure was unnecessarily suggestive are: (1)
whether the police made the defendant wear clothing similar to the
clothing worn by the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) whether the
defendant was of a race that differed from the race of the police of-
ficers around him; (3) whether the police officers conducting the
showup made the defendant say some of the words said by the crimi-
nal at the time of the crime; (4) whether statements made by the po-
lice officers or prosecutors suggested to the eyewitness that the police
officers or prosecutors believed the defendant committed the crime; (5)
whether the defendant was in handcuffs or in a jail cell at the time of
the showup; and (6) whether the police officers conducting the showup
presented the defendant simultaneously to multiple eyewitnesses.12 7
Unfortunately, the courts have not been uniform in their determi-
nations as to what constitutes unnecessarily suggestive identification
procedures.12s For example, in Smith v. Coiner, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a showup identifica-
tion at which the defendant was handcuffed and escorted by two police
124. With regard to suggestiveness, one court has explained that "one-on-one showups
are inherently suggestive ... because the victim can only choose from one person,
and, generally, that person is in police custody." Herrera, 902 A.2d at 183. Nev-
ertheless, the court further explained that the mere fact that the identification
occurs at a showup does not mean that the identification is automatically so im-
permissibly suggestive as to require moving immediately to the second reliability
step. Id.
125. Id. at 185 (citing Manson, 432 U.S. at 114).
126. A reviewing court must consider the totality of the circumstances when weighing
the suggestiveness of the identification against the reliability of the identifica-
tion. Manson, 432 U.S. at 114.
127. See Ferdinand S. Tinio, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Showup Identifi-
cation as Affected by Allegedly Suggestive Showup Procedures, 39 A.L.R. 3D 791
(2007).
128. Id.; see also Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 281 (explaining that "[tihe inferior
federal courts and the state courts have been inconsistent about the elemental
question of what circumstances rendered a pretrial procedure suggestive").
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officers, despite the fact that a lineup was feasible, was unnecessarily
suggestive. 12 9 Similarly, in Clark v. Caspari, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that a showup involving two
black suspects in handcuffs, surrounded by white police officers on a
city street, was unnecessarily suggestive. 130 However, in United
States v. Walker, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that a showup involving a defendant in handcuffs, sur-
rounded by police officers, was not unnecessarily suggestive. 13 ' And,
in State v. Wilson, the Appellate Division of New Jersey found that a
witness's identification of a defendant seated and handcuffed in the
back of a police vehicle was not per se unnecessarily suggestive. 13 2
Another example of the lack of uniformity among the courts per-
tains to how courts have viewed statements made by a police officer to
an eyewitness that convey the officer's belief that the correct person is
in custody. For example, in United States ex rel. Richardson v. Run-
dle,133 the Federal District Court of Pennsylvania held that a police
officer's statement to the eyewitness, "I think we've got the man," did
not render the showup unnecessarily suggestive. Yet, in State v. Pett-
way, a Connecticut court held that the following statement by a police
officer to the eyewitness was unnecessarily suggestive: "[W]e caught
the person, we're going to have you identify him."'13 4 Hence, what con-
stitutes an unnecessarily suggestive showup identification is unclear.
This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the question of whether a
showup procedure is unnecessarily suggestive is a highly subjective,
fact-sensitive determination. However, the uncertainty is largely due
to the fact that the United States Supreme Court has failed to define
the term "unnecessarily suggestive."135
The five reliability factors discussed by the Manson Court are also
highly subjective and fact-sensitive; thus, there has not been uniform-
ity among the courts as to what satisfies each of the five reliability
factors such that an identification is deemed admissible.13 6 Courts
129. Smith v. Coiner, 473 F.2d 877, 881 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 115
(1973).
130. Clark v. Caspari, 274 F.3d 507, 511 (8th Cir. 2001).
131. United States v. Walker, 201 F. App'x 737, 741 (11th Cir. 2006).
132. State v. Wilson, 827 A.2d 1143, 1147-48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2003).
133. United States ex rel. Richardson v. Rundle, 382 F. Supp. 633, 636, 641 (1974),
affd without opinion, at 511 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, at 422 U.S.
1047 (1975).
134. State v. Pettway, 664 A.2d 1125, 1129 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995), cert. denied at 665
A.2d 908 (Conn. 1995). Similarly, in State v. Davis, 767 A.2d 137, 143 (2001), the
Connecticut Appellate Court held that the police officer's statement to the victim
at the showup, "[w]e got him, we got him[ ] ... We had two boys. You got to tell
which one, who it is," rendered the showup procedure unnecessarily suggestive.
135. Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 283.
136. For example, with respect to the fifth factor, the delay between the identification
and the witnessing event, courts differ greatly in how tolerant they are of delay.
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have, however, been uniform in generally concluding that an identifi-
cation is reliable after evaluating the five reliability factors articu-
lated in Manson.137
Moreover, as discussed earlier, a showup identification is admissi-
ble even if counsel was not present at the identification unless the
showup was conducted at or after "the time that adversary judicial
proceedings [were] initiated."138 However, as noted above, because
the vast majority of showup identifications occur before adversary ju-
dicial proceedings begin, the right to counsel does not extend to most
showup identifications. 139
Thus, to summarize, a showup identification is admissible-even if
the procedures employed by the police officers when conducting the
showup were unnecessarily suggestive-so long as the court finds that
the showup identification was reliable. In addition, a showup identifi-
cation generally is admissible even if counsel was not present at the
showup identification.
B. Problems with the Present Admissibility Requirements
In light of the reprehensible number of individuals wrongly identi-
fied pursuant to showups and then subsequently convicted of crimes
they did not commit, it is clear that the current admissibility require-
ments are not protecting defendants sufficiently. This is largely due
to the fact that the Manson admissibility test permits a court to admit
an identification conducted pursuant to the most unnecessarily sug-
gestive procedures, so long as an examination of the five reliability
factors articulated by the Court weighs in favor of finding the identifi-
cation reliable. Yet, as commentators have noted, a court cannot re-
ally know whether an identification is reliable if suggestive
procedures were used, because even when an eyewitness (1) had the
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) was able
to pay careful attention at the time of the crime, (3) gave an accurate
E.g., State v. Hoskins, 14 P.3d 997, 1008 (Ariz. 2000) (upholding the reliability of
a showup identification despite the fact that it occurred approximately twelve
hours after the witnessing event); State v. Grice, 537 A.2d 683, 685-86 & n.1
(N.J. 1988) (upholding a showup identification made by a victim approximately
three hours after the crime was committed).
137. Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 284. Notably, most courts have applied the five
Manson factors exclusively in making reliability determinations, despite the Su-
preme Court's indication that the five factors were not meant to bar consideration
of other indicia of reliability. Id.; see, e.g., McFadden v. Cabana, 851 F.2d 784,
790 (5th Cir. 1988); Cooley v. Lockhart, 839 F.2d 431, 431-32 (8th Cir. 1988);
Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895-97 (6th Cir. 1986); Dickerson v. Fogg, 692
F.2d 238, 244-47 (2d Cir. 1982); Solomon v. Smith, 645 F.2d 1179, 1185-87 (2d
Cir. 1981).
138. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972).
139. See supra note 53.
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prior description, (4) demonstrated certainty when identifying the de-
fendant, and (5) had experienced minimal delay between the time of
the crime and the time of the identification, suggestive procedures can
have a profound effect on the eyewitness. 140 Even subtle postidentifi-
cation events can influence a witness's confidence in her identifica-
tion.14 1 According to psychologists Cutler and Penrod:
Eyewitness identifications take place in a social context in which the eyewit-
ness's performance can be influenced by her expectations and inferences,
which in turn can be influenced by the verbal and nonverbal behaviors of in-
vestigators, the structure of the identification test, and the environment in
which the identification test is conducted.142
Hence, for example, a cooperative witness, who observes the investiga-
tors' zeal, who hears the investigators' comments, and who notes that
the investigators went through the trouble of arranging the showup,
might feel pressure to contribute by making a positive identifica-
tion.1 43 Therefore, as noted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
"[cionsidering the complexity of the human mind and the subtle ef-
fects of suggestive procedures upon it, a determination that an identi-
fication was unaffected by such procedures must itself be open to
serious question."144
140. See State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 592 (2005) ("Because a witness can be influ-
enced by the suggestive procedure itself, a court cannot know exactly how reliable
the identification would have been without the suggestiveness."); Keith A. Find-
ley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study
Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 334 n.2 (2002) (explaining that
because reliability factors "are so affected by suggestiveness, they provide a poor
basis upon which to evaluate whether an identification is sufficiently reliable to
overcome that very suggestiveness"); Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 291 (explain-
ing that
[u]nnecessarily suggestive pretrial identification procedures differ from
most other improper law enforcement activities because they do not fur-
ther any valid law enforcement interest. Although a violation of a sus-
pect's fourth of fifth amendment rights-for example, a warrantless
search or an interrogation without a lawyer present-is plainly wrong, it
might at least further the valid law enforcement objective of collecting
relevant evidence. By contrast, an unnecessarily suggestive identifica-
tion procedure simply creates unreliable evidence where reliable evi-
dence could have been gathered. It is not a case where good ends justify
bad means-the end result of an unnecessarily suggestive procedure is
worthless precisely because of the means used.)
This is especially true given that "it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for
courts to distinguish between identifications that were reliable and identifica-
tions that were unreliable." Dubose, 699 N.W.2d at 592.
141. Judges, supra note 109, at 264 ("Research also shows that witnesses's confidence
in the accuracy of their identification can also be affected by post-identification
events.").
142. Id. (citing BRAN L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE
EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW 113 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995)).
143. CUTLER & PENROD, supra note 142, at 114.
144. State v. Leclair, 385 A.2d 831, 833 (N.H. 1978).
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Furthermore, the five reliability factors articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Manson "are not valid predictors of the reliability of
eyewitness testimony" because they are based upon incorrect assump-
tions.14 5 One commentator has explained that "[psychological stud-
ies demonstrate that each of the factors identified by the Court, and
subsequently applied by the inferior federal courts and state courts, is
either unsupported as a scientific matter or dangerously
incomplete."'4 6
In delineating the first factor, eyewitness certainty, the Supreme
Court likely succumbed to the fallacious belief that the more certain
an eyewitness is about an identification, the more reliable the identifi-
cation is likely to be. However, scientific studies have repeatedly
demonstrated that there is no significant correlation between an eye-
witness's level of certainty in an identification and the accuracy of
that identification.Z4 7 With regard to the second factor, "the
[a]ccuracy of the [e]yewitness's prior description,"148 the Supreme
Court must have presumed that if an eyewitness's prior description of
a face is similar to the face later identified, the identification is likely
reliable. However, scientific evidence indicates that there is no "ap-
preciable relationship between a person's prior description of a face
and the person's accuracy in identifying the face" 14 9 because "al-
though faces easily evoke verbal labels as word associates, ease of la-
beling [is] not related to accuracy of facial recognition."15 0
Although eyewitness attention during the witnessing event, the
eyewitness's opportunity to view the criminal during the witnessing
event, and the delay between the witnessing event and the identifica-
tion (the third, fourth, and fifth reliability factors, respectively) all
145. Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 275.
146. Id. at 276.
147. Id. at 276-77 (citing Brian L. Cutler, Steven D. Penrod & Todd K. Martens, The
Reliability of Eyewitness Identification: The Role of System and Estimator Vari-
ables, 11 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 234 (1987)); see Kenneth A. Deffenbacher,
Eyewitness Accuracy and Confidence: Can We Infer Anything About Their Rela-
tionship?, 4 LAw & Hum. BEHAV. 243, 245-48, 258 (1980); Gary L. Wells & Donna
M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
PERSPECTIVES 155 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth F. Loftus eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 1984).
148. Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 277.
149. Id. at 277; see Alvin G. Goldstein, Karen S. Johnson & June Chance, Does Flu-
ency of Face Description Imply Superior Face Recognition?, 13 BULL. PSYCHO-
NOMIC Soc'Y 15, 15-18 (1979); Thomas H. Howells, A Study of Ability to Recognize
Faces, 33 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 124, 125-27 (1938); Gary L. Wells &
Donna M. Murray, What Can Psychology Say About the Neil v. Biggers Criteria
for Judging Eyewitness Accuracy?, 68 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 347, 354-55 (1983).
150. A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 138 (The Free
Press 1979); see also Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 277 (noting that scientific
evidence does not support a relationship between prior descriptions and
accuracy).
[Vol. 86:515
SHOWUP IDENTIFICATIONS
have important implications for reliability, these factors have been
misunderstood and misapplied by the courts.' 5 1 With regard to the
third factor, many courts believe that a person in danger is likely to be
more attentive than a person not in danger. i 5 2 However, science has
dispelled such a notion and, in fact, has found the contrary to be true:
Eyewitness identifications made by people who are in danger at the
time of the initial observation of the criminal are less reliable than
identifications made by people whose initial observations of the crimi-
nal are made under calmer circumstances.153 With regard to the
fourth factor, when evaluating a witness's opportunity to view the
criminal, courts consistently fail to consider that science has demon-
strated that the vast majority of people overestimate the duration of
the witnessing event.1 54 And, with regard to the fifth reliability fac-
tor, many courts fail to consider the fact that a witness's memory dete-
riorates drastically immediately after the initial observation of the
criminal and then deteriorates minimally with subsequent delay.iS5
As such, utilization of the five reliability factors is problematic.
Moreover, admission of an unnecessarily suggestive identification,
so long as the identification is deemed reliable, and regardless of the
criteria used to determine reliability, is not constitutionally sound.i5 6
First, it is not sound because "[t]o a person whose fate depends on the
accuracy of an identification, it is fundamentally unfair for the police
to unnecessarily employ a technique that maximizes the potential for
error."157 Second, as Justice Marshall eloquently explained in his dis-
sent in Manson:
[The test articulated by the majority in Manson] suggests a reinterpretation of
the concept of due process of law in criminal cases. The decision suggests that
due process violations in identification procedures may not be measured by
151. See Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 277-79.
152. Id. at 278 (citing Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 234-35 (1977) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) ("One need only observe another person's face for 10 seconds by the
clock .... To the resisting woman, the 10 to 15 seconds would seem endless.")).
153. Id. at 278 (citing Hadyn D. Ellis, Practical Aspects of Face Memory, in EYEWIT-
NESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 12, 20 (Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth
F. Loftus eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1984)).
154. Id. at 278.
155. Id. at 279 (citing LoFrus, supra note 58, at 53); JOHN W. SHEPHERD ET AL., supra
note 100; Samuel R. Gross, supra note 100, at 399.
156. Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 276 ('Since the Supreme Court has held that the
sole value underlying the right [to due process] is reliability, the critically impor-
tant interest of procedural fairness in pretrial identification procedures is
unprotected.").
157. State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 198 (N.J. 2006) (Albin, J., dissenting). The Su-
preme Court has noted that "[a] major factor contributing to the high incidence of
miscarriage ofjustice from mistaken identification has been the degree of sugges-
tion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to
witnesses for pretrial identification." United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228
(1967).
2008]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
whether the government employed procedures violating standards of funda-
mental fairness. By relying on the probable accuracy of a challenged identifi-
cation, instead of the necessity for its use, the Court seems to be ascertaining
whether the defendant was probably guilty. Until today, I had thought that
"Equal justice under law" meant that the existence of constitutional violations
did not depend on the race, sex, religion, nationality, or likely guilt of the ac-
cused. The Due Process Clause requires adherence to the same high standard
of fundamental fairness in dealing with every criminal defendant, whatever
his personal characteristics and irrespective of the strength of the State's case
against him. Strong evidence that the defendant is guilty should be relevant
only to the determination whether an error of constitutional magnitude was
nevertheless harmless beyond a reasonable doubt .... By importing the ques-
tion of guilt into the initial determination of whether there was a constitu-
tional violation, the apparent effect of the Court's decision is to undermine the
protection afforded by the Due Process Clause. 1 5 8
Hence, permitting a court to admit a showup identification at which
the police employed unnecessarily suggestive procedures, merely if
the identification is adjudged reliable, is constitutionally infirm.159
Another problem with the present admissibility requirements for
showup identifications is that showups conducted in the absence of
exigency, 160 as well as showups that are not conducted in close tempo-
ral proximity to the time the eyewitness initially viewed the crimi-
nal,161 are admissible. Permitting the admission of showup
identifications conducted absent exigency is problematic in that police
officers have little incentive to use more reliable methods of identifica-
tion, such as a lineup, because the showup identification will not be
suppressed even though a more reliable method of identification could
have been used. In addition, permitting the admission of showup
identifications that are not made in close temporal proximity to the
witnessing event is problematic as the likelihood of misidentification
becomes much greater for a showup relative to a lineup as time
passes, yet, absent the threat of suppression, police officers have little
incentive to use a lineup.
Furthermore, it is not constitutionally sound to permit the admis-
sion of showup identifications when exigency did not necessitate the
use of a showup and the showup was not made in close temporal prox-
imity to the time the eyewitness initially viewed the criminal. The
standard required by the Due Process Clause is that of fairness. 16 2
158. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 128 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
159. One commentator described the present due process test as "nothing more than a
superficial inquiry into the competency of the witness to testify: Did the eyewit-
ness observe enough at the scene of the crime so that the trial judge should per-
mit his testimony?" Charles A. Pulaski, Neil v. Biggers: The Supreme Court
Dismantles the Wade Trilogy's Due Process Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1097,
1113 (1974).
160. See discussion of exigency supra Part W.A.
161. See discussion of temporal closeness supra Part IV.B.
162. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783,790 (1977); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165, 169-72 (1952); see Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 290 ("[T]he Court has con-
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When a person's "fate depends on the accuracy of an identification",16 3
fairness mandates that police officers employ procedures that mini-
mize "the potential for error."164 Thus, the fairness requirements of
the Due Process Clause are violated and showups should be sup-
pressed where they are not mandated by exigency, as well as where
they are not done in close temporal proximity to the eyewitness's ini-
tial viewing of the criminal.
The final problem with the present admissibility requirements is
that a showup identification is generally admissible even if counsel
was not present at the showup. Yet, the same evils that the Supreme
Court hoped to alleviate by extending the right to counsel at identifi-
cations conducted "at or after the time that adversary judicial proceed-
ings have been initiated," are present and problematic at showup
identifications conducted before "adversary judicial proceedings have
been initiated."'165 For example, one of the reasons the Supreme
Court gave for requiring the presence of counsel at identifications con-
ducted at or after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings is
that "the confrontation compelled by the State between the accused
and the victim or witnesses to a crime to elicit identification evidence
is peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and variable factors
which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a fair trial."166
Yet, identifications conducted before the initiation of judicial proceed-
ings are just as "peculiarly riddled with innumerable dangers and va-
riable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from a
fair trial."167 And, like at an identification conducted at or after the
initiation of judicial proceedings, counsel at a showup identification
conducted before the initiation of judicial proceedings would be "alert
for conditions prejudicial to the suspect" that the suspect is unlikely or
unable to notice.16s
Additionally, the United States Constitution supports the exten-
sion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to a showup identifica-
tion conducted prior to the initiation of judicial proceedings. The
Sixth Amendment reads, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fense."169 In Kirby v. Illinois,170 the United States Supreme Court
wrongly held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "attaches
sistently assigned to the due process clause in other circumstances the role of
serving as a guarantor of standards of fairness and decency.").
163. State v. Herrera, 902 A.2d 177, 198 (N.J. 2006) (Albin, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688 (1972).
166. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 230.
169. U.S. CONST. amend. VI
170. 406 U.S. at 682.
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only at or after the time adversary judicial proceedings have been ini-
tiated,"1 7 1 which occurs by way of "formal charge, preliminary hear-
ing, indictment, information, or arraignment." 172 In truth, the Sixth
Amendment does not support limiting the right to counsel at identifi-
cations to only those identifications that occur at or after the time ad-
versary judicial proceedings have been initiated. The United States
Supreme Court explained in Wade that "It]he plain wording of [the
Sixth Amendment] encompasses counsel's assistance whenever neces-
sary to assure a meaningful 'defence'."1 73 And, as discussed earlier,
counsel's assistance is necessary at any identification procedure, re-
gardless of the stage in the judicial process at which it is conducted, to
assure a meaningful defense. 17 4 As such, a correct interpretation of
the Sixth Amendment requires that the right to counsel extend to all
identifications, including showups, regardless of whether they are
made at or after the initiation of judicial proceedings.
C. Suggested Admissibility Requirements
Given the problems with the present admissibility standards gov-
erning showup identifications, several changes are necessary.
1. Unnecessarily Suggestive
Given the fairness implications of due process and the questionable
soundness of the Manson reliability factors, as well as the difficulty in
discerning the reliability of showup identifications when made pursu-
ant to unnecessarily suggestive procedures, the Supreme Court should
re-examine the showup identification admissibility test articulated in
Manson. The Court should hold that a showup identification is admis-
sible only if the procedures employed by the police officers who con-
ducted the showup identification were not unnecessarily suggestive.
In addition, given that the courts have not been uniform in their de-
terminations as to what constitutes unnecessarily suggestive identifi-
cation procedures, the Supreme Court should provide guidance as to
what constitutes an unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure
to the extent possible given the fact-sensitive, subjective nature of
such a determination. For example, one commentator has suggested
that the following definition of suggestiveness be considered:
[A] pretrial identification is suggestive if and only if the witness is in some
way apprised of which person in the pretrial identification procedure the po-
lice believe to be the perpetrator. If the witness is "tipped off" in this way,
then the witness's selection of a person from the pretrial identification proce-
dure would be the result not simply of the process of recognition, but of the
171. Id. at 688.
172. Id. at 689.
173. Wade, 388 U.S. at 225.
174. Id. at 228-32.
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witness's inference about the police's behavior. In other words, the witness
may think not only that, "I believe that X is the assailant because I recognize
him," which is a perfectly acceptable chain of thinking, but might also think,
"I believe that X is the assailant because I recognize him and the police think
that he is the assailant," which is plainly an improper method of identification
for the witness to employ.
1 7 5
Additionally, the highest state courts, independent of any action
taken by the United States Supreme Court, should hold, pursuant to
their own state constitutions, that a showup identification is admissi-
ble only if the procedures employed by the police officers who con-
ducted the showup identification were not unnecessarily suggestive.
In fact, at least one state court has already held that unnecessarily
suggestive showup procedures will preclude the admissibility of an
identification, regardless of whether the identification made is
deemed reliable. 1 76 In Commonwealth v. Johnson, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court held that the Massachusetts Constitution re-
quires the exclusion of any unnecessarily suggestive identification,
even if the identification is reliable. 177
Excluding unnecessarily suggestive identifications will reduce the
number of problematic eyewitness identifications made pursuant to
showups that are admitted in courts and subsequently utilized by ju-
ries. Moreover, such a change will better serve the three important
interests articulated by the Manson Court in justifying its totality of
the circumstances approach to admissibility: (1) preventing juries
from hearing "eyewitness testimony unless the evidence has aspects of
reliability;" (2) deterring police officers from engaging in unnecessa-
rily suggestive procedures; and (3) administering justice. 178 First, be-
cause a court cannot discern accurately whether an identification is
reliable if unnecessarily suggestive procedures were used, and be-
cause the Manson reliability factors are not dependable indicators of
reliability, suppression of showup identifications conducted pursuant
to unnecessarily suggestive procedures better prevents juries from
hearing "eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of re-
liability" than does admission of such showup identifications. Second,
as even the Manson Court admitted, police officers will be more de-
terred from engaging in unnecessarily suggestive procedures if
showup identifications made pursuant to unnecessarily suggestive
procedures are per se inadmissible than if a court determination of
reliability can salvage an identification's admissibility. Third, justice
will be better served by suppressing showup identification evidence
obtained pursuant to unnecessarily suggestive procedures. The Man-
son Court held that the administration ofjustice is better served by its
175. Rosenberg, supra note 105, at 298-99 (emphasis omitted).
176. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 650 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Mass. 1995).
177. Id. at 1261.
178. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112-13 (1977).
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totality of the circumstances test because a per se prohibition of any
identification made pursuant to unnecessarily suggestive procedures
"denies the trier reliable evidence," which "may result, on occasion, in
the guilty going free." 179 Although some guilty individuals may go
free, justice will be better served by prohibiting the admission of iden-
tifications made pursuant to unnecessarily suggestive procedures be-
cause far fewer innocent individuals will be wrongly incarcerated,
which in turn will also result in the police continuing to pursue the
"real outlaw [s] ."180
In addition, admissibility of identification evidence should never
turn on the reliability of the evidence because, as noted by Justice
Marshall in his Manson dissent, although "other exclusionary rules
have been criticized for preventing jury consideration of relevant and
usually reliable evidence in order to serve interests unrelated to guilt
or innocence, such as discouraging illegal searches or denial of coun-
sel,"181 "[s]uggestively obtained eyewitness testimony is excluded, in
contrast, precisely because of its unreliability and concomitant irrele-
vance. Its exclusion both protects the integrity of the truth-seeking
function of the trial and discourages police use of needlessly inaccu-
rate and ineffective investigatory methods."18 2
2. Exigency and Close Temporal Proximity
The admission of showup identifications that are conducted in the
absence of exigency, as well as those that are not conducted in close
temporal proximity to the time the eyewitness initially viewed the
criminal, is problematic, as well as unconstitutional. Thus, the United
States Supreme Court should hold that a showup identification is ad-
missible only if utilization of a showup identification was necessitated
by exigencyl 8 3 and only if the showup identification was conducted in
close temporal proximity to the time the eyewitness initially viewed
the criminal. Moreover, regardless of a future United States Supreme
Court holding to that effect, the highest court of every state should
hold, pursuant to their own state constitutions, that a showup identifi-
cation is admissible only if it was necessitated by exigency and con-
ducted in close temporal proximity to the time the eyewitness initially
viewed the criminal.184
179. Id. at 112.
180. Id. at 127 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Should the Supreme Court refuse to hold that showup identifications that are
conducted absent exigency are inadmissible pursuant to the Due Process Clause,
the Supreme Court should hold that showup identifications that are conducted
absent exigency are unnecessarily suggestive, and thus, inadmissible.
184. Some state courts have, in fact, held that showups conducted absent exigent cir-
cumstances are inadmissible. See People v. Riley, 517 N.E.2d 520, 524 (N.Y.
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Suppression of showup identifications that were not necessitated
by exigency and that were not conducted in close temporal proximity
to the time the eyewitness initially viewed the criminal will better
serve the three interests articulated by the Manson Court in justifying
its totality of the circumstances approach to admissibility.1 8 5 First,
juries will be prevented, to a greater extent than under the current
admissibility rules, from hearing "eyewitness testimony unless that
evidence has aspects of reliability"18 6 because by excluding non-exi-
gent, delayed showup identifications, there will be a drastic reduction
in the number of showups conducted by police officers and an associ-
ated drastic increase in the number of eyewitness identifications con-
ducted pursuant to more reliable methods of identification, such as a
lineup. This will likely result in a reduction in the number of showup
misidentifications made and, thus, subsequently presented to juries.
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, excluding showup identifications
made after a delay will likely reduce the number of misidentifications
made pursuant to showups, which in turn, will likely reduce trial
presentation of eyewitness testimony that lacks "aspects of reliabil-
ity."187 Second, making admissibility of showup identifications con-
tingent upon exigency and immediacy will more effectively deter
police officers from engaging in unnecessarily suggestive procedures
because the threat of exclusion will loom large. Third, the exclusion of
non-exigent, delayed showup identifications will better serve justice
because it is likely that fewer unreliable eyewitness identifications
will be heard by juries and, thus, presumably far fewer individuals
will be wrongly convicted by juries.
1987) (concluding that showup identifications are inadmissible in the absence of
exigent circumstances); People v. Rachford, No. 2002SU17697, slip op. at 3-4
(N.Y. Dist. Ct. May 6, 2004) ("Showup identifications are permissible if exigent
circumstances require immediate identification .... In other words, showups are
permitted if there is some necessity to resort to the procedure."); State v. Dubose,
699 N.W.2d 582, 593-94 (Wis. 2005) ("[Elvidence obtained from an out-of-court
showup is inherently suggestive and will not be admissible unless, based on the
totality of the circumstances, the procedure was necessary. A showup will not be
necessary, however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or,
as a result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a lineup or
photo array").
Also, many courts have stated, in dicta, that a showup identification, con-
ducted absent exigent circumstances, should be inadmissible. See State v. Law-
son, 959 P.2d 923, 927 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998) ("Absent exigent circumstances, the
use of one person show-ups by law enforcement has been condemned."); People v.
Smith, 487 N.Y.S.2d 210, 212 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) ("In the absence of exigent
circumstance . . .one-on-one viewings . . .are strongly disfavored."). However,
the condemnation of showup identifications conducted absent exigent circum-
stances in dicta is not sufficient.
185. Manson, 432 U.S. at 112-13.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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3. Presence of Counsel
The presence of counsel at all showup identifications, regardless of
whether judicial proceedings have begun, is necessary to protect
against those evils the Supreme Court hoped to abolish by requiring
the presence of counsel at identifications conducted at or after the ini-
tiation of judicial proceedings. Moreover, the presence of counsel is
necessitated by the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, the United States
Supreme Court and the highest state courts ought to hold that a
showup identification is admissible only if counsel was present at the
identification.
Such a change will also more effectively serve the three important
interests articulated by the Manson Court in support of its totality of
the circumstances approach to admissibility.1 8 8 First, the presence of
counsel will prevent juries from hearing "eyewitness testimony unless
that evidence has aspects of reliability"189 to a greater extent than do
the present admissibility rules. An attorney is more likely "alert [to]
conditions prejudicial to [a] suspect,"190 and thus, can object prior to
an eyewitness making an identification tainted by suggestiveness that
will likely be unreliable. Second, the presence of counsel will deter
police officers from engaging in unnecessarily suggestive procedures
to a greater extent than the present admissibility requirements be-
cause an attorney can object to the utilization of unnecessarily sugges-
tive procedures. Moreover, even if the officers utilize unnecessarily
suggestive procedures, an attorney, having observed the utilization of
such unnecessarily suggestive procedures, will be better able to effec-
tively argue for the exclusion of the identification in court. Further,
should the identification be admitted, an attorney who observed an
identification will be better able to provide a meaningful defense for a
client through effective cross-examination of the eyewitness.
Third, the number of problematic eyewitness identifications either
admitted in court or accepted by the jury will be minimized and justice
will be better served by having counsel present at all showup identifi-
cations because counsel has the ability to (1) object to unnecessarily
suggestive procedures at the time of the identification, (2) adequately
reconstruct the unnecessarily suggestive aspects of the procedures for
the court when arguing for the exclusion of the identification, and (3)
188. Id. It is noteworthy that, as the Wade Court explained,
it is a matter of common experience that, once a witness has picked out
the accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back on his word later on,
so that in practice the issue of identity may (in the absence of other rele-
vant evidence) for all practical purposes be determined there and then,
before the trial.
U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 229 (1967) (quoting Glanville Williams & H. A. Ham-
melmann, Identification Parades-I, 1963 CrIM. L. REV. 479, 482).
189. Manson, 432 U.S. at 112.
190. Wade, 388 U.S. at 230-31.
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effectively cross-examine an eyewitness in court regarding an admit-
ted, yet suggestive identification. Thus, juries will be less likely to
convict innocent people on the basis of showup misidentifications.191
In addition, it is important to note that showup identifications, on
average, have more characteristics of a "critical stage," at which the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, than does a photographic
array; thus, unlike the photographic array, the right to counsel ought
to attach to showups. The Third Circuit has explained that a photo-
graphic identification differs from a live identification where a defen-
dant "may be forced to act, speak or dress in a suggestive way, where
the possibilities for suggestion are multiplied, where the ability to re-
construct the events is minimized, and where the effect of a positive
identification is likely to be permanent." 19 2 Moreover, the Third Cir-
cuit aptly noted that the "viewing of immobile photographs [is] easily
reconstructible, far less subject to subtle suggestion, and far less in-
delible in its effect when the witness is later brought face to face with
the accused." 19 3 Thus, the United States Supreme Court and the
highest state courts ought to hold that showup identifications, unlike
photographic arrays, are "critical stages" to which the Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel attaches. Thus, failure to provide counsel at a
showup should result in the showup identification being inadmissible.
D. Summary
The present admissibility requirements for showup identifications
are too lenient to prevent problematic showup identifications from be-
191. Unfortunately, it would be impracticable to require the presence of the counsel
that will represent the defendant through the end of the defendant's criminal
proceedings at a showup identification of the defendant. However, the Sixth
Amendment does not mandate as much; rather, the Sixth Amendment merely
requires the presence of counsel. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. To comply, the office of
the public defender should provide an attorney to any person who is the target of
a showup identification, regardless of whether that attorney will represent that
individual in the future. If the attorney present at the showup identification does
not represent the defendant through the completion of all judicial proceedings,
the attorney who does subsequently represent the defendant will not be able to
recreate the identification procedures for the court or cross-examine an eyewit-
ness as effectively as had he been present at the identification. However, the
notes taken by the attorney present at the showup, as well as the ability to com-
municate with the attorney present at the showup, will prove far more useful to
the defendant's subsequent attorney than any description of the identification
procedures provided by the defendant.
In addition, if the target of a showup identification can immediately contact a
private attorney, and his attorney is able to observe the showup identification at
that time, then police officers should not conduct the showup identification until
the target's attorney is present.
192. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300,324 (1973) (quoting United States ex rel. Reed
v. Anderson, 461 F.2d 739, 745 (3d Cir. 1972)).
193. Id.
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ing presented to juries. As such, comprehensive changes to the admis-
sibility rules are warranted. It is not enough to merely prohibit the
admission in court of showup identifications conducted absent exi-
gency. Nor is it enough to merely prohibit the admission in court of
showup identifications conducted absent the presence of counsel.
Rather, it is necessary to make inadmissible any unnecessarily sug-
gestive showup identification, any showup identification conducted
absent exigency, any showup identification that was not conducted in
close temporal proximity to the witnessing event, and any showup
identification conducted absent the presence of counsel.
Such comprehensive changes to the admissibility requirements for
showup identifications will drastically reduce the number of showup
identifications conducted, which in turn will increase the number of
identifications conducted pursuant to more reliable methods, such as
a lineup. Moreover, such comprehensive changes will also drastically
reduce police usage of unnecessarily suggestive identification proce-
dures when conducting showups, as well as the number of problematic
eyewitness identifications presented to juries. Also, these changes
will result in counsel being better able to defend against possible mis-
identifications at the initial showup, to reconstruct any suggestive
procedures used by the police officers conducting the showup for the
court, and to provide an effective defense through effective cross-ex-
amination of eyewitnesses.
Thus, because changes to the admissibility requirements for
showup identifications are warranted under the United States Consti-
tution and all relevant state constitutions, the United States Supreme
Court and the highest court of every state ought to revisit and revise
their admissibility requirements for showup identifications in con-
formance with the above-discussed suggestions. 19 4
194. The United States Supreme Court, and the highest court in every state, should
not hold that all identifications made pursuant to showups are inadmissible. Al-
though such a rule would eliminate problematic showup identifications from com-
ing before a jury, and would ensure that all eyewitness identifications are made
pursuant to more reliable identification methods, such a rigid rule is problematic
in that it does not give police officers the flexibility to use showups when exigent
circumstances make use of other identification procedures impractical, such as
when the police need an immediate identification because a victim's life is at risk.
Moreover, such a rigid rule is unnecessary so long as courts employ the height-
ened admissibility requirements suggested in this Article. Thus, a complete ban
on the admissibility of identifications made pursuant to showups is not the
proper way to ensure that fewer problematic eyewitness identifications come
before juries.
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VI. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The vast majority of courts have refused to admit expert testimony
pertaining to the reliability of eyewitness identifications.195 Yet, in
order to reduce juror reliance on problematic eyewitness identifica-
tions, courts generally should admit expert testimony pertaining to
eyewitness identifications (in addition to improving police procedures
for conducting showups and improving admissibility requirements for
showup identifications).
Many commentators have asserted that courts should admit expert
testimony regarding eyewitness identifications in general,19 6 because
many jurors have misconceptions regarding the memory process, and
these misconceptions have a profound influence on the credibility ju-
rors assign to eyewitness identifications.19 7 Research has shown that
those factors that affect the accuracy of an eyewitness identification
are largely unknown to the average juror.198 For example, most peo-
ple believe that witnesses better remember the details of a violent
crime than of a nonviolent crime despite that research shows that the
opposite is true.19 9 Another common belief that runs contrary to sci-
entific data is that the more confidence a witness exhibits in an identi-
fication, the more accurate that identification is likely to be; however,
there is no consistent relationship between witness confidence and ac-
curacy. 20 0 Thus, incorrect perceptions held by jurors may contribute
195. See DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., SCIENCE IN THE LAW: SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCI-
ENCE ISSUES § 8-1.1 370 n.3 (West Group 2002); Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges
Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony,
2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 3, 23 (citing PAUL C. GIANELLI & EDWARD J. IM-
WINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 9.2(C) 434-39 (3d ed. 1999)); O'Hagan, supra
note 57, at 757 (citing United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.
1984)).
196. See Fradella, supra note 195, at 23-29; O'Hagan, supra note 57, at 742 (asserting
that courts should admit eyewitness expert testimony); Christopher M. Walters,
Comment, Admission of Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification, 73 CAL.
L. REV. 1402 (1985).
197. See Fradella, supra note 195, at 25; O'Hagan, supra note 57, at 760-61.
198. See O'Hagan, supra note 57, at 760; see generally Kenneth A. Deffenbacher &
Elizabeth F. Loftus, Do Jurors Share a Common Understanding Concerning Eye-
witness Behavior?, 6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 15 (1982) (reporting a study finding
that participants did not share a common understanding of factors impacting
eyewitness behavior). In fact, when surveyed, potential jurors answered correctly
only approximately fifty percent of questions pertaining to human perception.
LOFTUS, supra note 58, at 172-77.
199. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Ten Years in the Life of an Expert Witness, 10 LAw &
HUM. BEHAV. 241, 250 n.8 (1986).
200. Id. Even the United States Supreme Court has previously noted that confidence
is a factor for consideration in determining whether an identification is suffi-
ciently reliable. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977); Neil v. Big-
gers, 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
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to why jurors generally believe eyewitness testimony, even when there
is reason to doubt the accuracy of an identification. 20 1
As such, in order to improve jurors' ability to determine the accu-
racy of an eyewitness identification, courts should admit eyewitness
testimony to assist the trier of fact in understanding how the memory,
retrieval, and perception processes work, as well as how circum-
stances surrounding an identification can affect the accuracy of the
identification, 2 02 instead of assuming that cross-examination alone
will result in the jury drawing all necessary and proper inferences re-
garding eyewitness reliability. 20 3 The expert would merely serve to
increase a juror's ability to evaluate the eyewitness identification by
relaying the results of studies, as well as how those studies apply to
the "real world," without commenting on the credibility or reliability
of a particular witness.204 For example, the expert might comment on
how stress can affect the reliability of an identification. 20 5
Such testimony is appropriate as it is "the form of social science
evidence which is most solidly based in 'hard' empirical science"206 in
that
[elxpert testimony concerning the limitations and weaknesses of eyewitness
identification is firmly rooted in experimental foundation, derived from de-
cades of psychological research on human perception and memory as well as
an impressive peer review literature. Like [battered women's syndrome or
rape trauma syndrome] evidence, this testimony purports to educate the
factfinder about reasons a witness at trial should be believed or disbelieved.
The expert is prepared to testify about the factors that adversely affect accu-
racy (for example, stress, "weapon focus," and confusion of post-event informa-
tion) and to contradict assumptions likely to be shared by jurors, such as the
equation of the witness's level of certainty with the accuracy of the
identification. 2 0 7
201. See Walters, supra note 196, at 1408 (1985) (hypothesizing that "incorrect com-
monsense inferences" by jurors "may well contribute to juror] overconfidence in
eyewitness testimony"). But see LoFTus, supra note 58, at 8-19 (explaining that
one study conducted indicated that jurors' belief of a witness was not altered by
the knowledge that the eyewitness had 20/400 vision).
202. Unfortunately, many federal courts have been reluctant to admit expert testi-
mony pertaining to eyewitness identifications. See O'Hagan, supra note 57, at
757-66 (explaining that courts have been reluctant to admit such testimony and
listing the reasons cited by courts in refusing to admit such testimony).
203. Walters, supra note 196, at 1407 ("[Elyewitness-expert testimony typically fo-
cuses on two major subject areas: how the processes of perception, memory, and
retrieval of information work in general, and how specific circumstances sur-
rounding an identification at issue may have affected its accuracy.").
204. Id. at 1406.
205. Id. at 1407 (discussing the Yerkes-Dodson law, which states that although mod-
erate stress may lead to more acute perception, high levels of sustained stress can
result in a decline of identification accuracy).
206. Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of
a Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REv. 867, 889 (2005).
207. Id. at 890.
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Hence, courts should regularly permit the use of expert testimony per-
taining to eyewitness identification, especially in the context of
showup identifications, given the lax rules of admissibility for such
identifications and, more importantly, jurors' propensity to believe
such identifications. Such expert testimony will likely help jurors un-
derstand how to process information regarding eyewitness testimony,
decreasing juror reliance upon suspect showup identifications.20 8
VII. CONCLUSION
Showup identifications are extremely problematic eyewitness iden-
tifications. Yet, the admissibility requirements for showup identifica-
tions are lax and jurors have a propensity to believe such
identifications regardless of their reliability. In addition, police of-
ficers have little motivation to utilize methods of identification that
are more reliable than showups, such as lineups, given the present
legislative mandates, internal police rules, and lenient admissibility
requirements.
Given the compelling problem presented by the high number of in-
dividuals who are or likely will be wrongly convicted on the basis of
showup misidentifications and this problem's multifaceted nature, a
comprehensive approach to address the problem is necessary. Such
an approach must ensure the greatest possible reduction in police us-
age of showup identification procedures, the greatest possible increase
in the reliability of the showup identifications that must be conducted,
and the greatest possible increase in the protection of a showup tar-
get's constitutional rights. To accomplish these beneficial outcomes,
changes in police procedures are necessary, regardless of the impetus
for such changes. Further, the admissibility rules governing showup
identifications must be made significantly more stringent and more in
compliance with the guarantees of the Due Process Clause and the
Sixth Amendment. Finally, courts, in general, should admit expert
testimony regarding eyewitness identifications. Such comprehensive
changes will likely have a profoundly positive effect on our criminal
justice system, with minimal additional strain on police officers, attor-
neys, and judges.
208. In the same vein, in order to decrease jury reliance on showup misidentifications,
judges could give uniform instructions focusing a jury's attention on several im-
portant factors that can affect a witness's ability to accurately identify a
defendant.
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